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whether the sixth amendment guarantees an indigent inmate the right to counsel prior to indictment if the inmate is confined to administrative detention and under criminal investigation. 5 The Court held that an indigent inmate isolated in administrative segregation is not entitled to appointed counsel prior to the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings. 6 This decision departs from the Court's prior emphasis on securing a fair trial for an "accused."
This Note begins with a summary of the facts in Gouveia. It then reviews the Court's majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. In the discussion, the Note analyzes how the Court's decision misconstrues precedent and ignores important policy considerations. The Note concludes that the inmates in Gouveia should have been appointed counsel before the formal commencement of adversary proceedings.
II. THE DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. GouVEIA

A. THE FACTS
On November 11, 1978 , prison officials at the Federal Correctional Institution in Lompoc, California, found inmate Thomas "Hoppo" Trejo stabbed to death in cell A-18. 7 An autopsy disclosed that Trejo had received forty-five stab wounds around his heart. 8 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officials and prison authorities initiated independent investigations following Trejo's death. 9 Prison officials immediately suspected that inmates Adolpho nied their rights to counsel and speedy trial under the sixth amendment. United States v. Mills, No. 80-278 (D. Cal. Aug. 14, 1980) (available Sept. 15, 1984 , on LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded for trial. United States v. Mills, 641 F.2d 785 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 902 (1981) . At the trial, Mills and Pierce were convicted of first degree murder and conveyance of a weapon in prison. See infra note 24. The inmates appealed their convictions. Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1117.
The court of appeals, sitting en banc, consolidated the inmates' appeals to consider whether the appellants were denied their sixth amendment right to counsel while they were confined to administrative segregation. Id. The Supreme Court's review focused on the same issue. See Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2296 n.l. 5 104 S. Ct. at 2296. The Court specifically focused its review in Gouveia on inmates who lacked the financial resources to retain private counsel. Id. 6 Id. at 2300. 7 Id. at 2295; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. 2292 Ct. (1984 , rev ' Gouveia, 704 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1983 The FBI interviewed Gouveia about his knowledge of Trejo's murder on December 6, 1978.12 Later that month, prison officials continued their investigation of the stabbing incident by conducting disciplinary hearings.' 3 During the hearings, prison authorities concluded that Respondents were involved in Trejo's murder.' 4 Accordingly, they ordered that Respondents remain isolated in the ADU. 15 Despite Respondents' repeated requests for appointed counsel, 16 they were not afforded the assistance of counsel during District of California also opened a file on Trejo's murder and assigned a staff member to investigate the incident by November 29, 1978 . Brief for Respondent William Gouveia, Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2292 (1984 12 Brief for Gouveia, supra note 9. The FBI agent read Gouveia his rights prior to the interview "as if he were an accused in a criminal case." Id.
13 When inmates violate prison regulations, they generally are subjected to a disciplinary hearing. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 463-64 (1983); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 562 (1974) . Prison authorities use disciplinary proceedings to evaluate the inmates' alleged misconduct and to impose appropriate sanctions. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 562. Disciplinary hearings also elicit confrontations between "inmates who are being disciplined and those who would. . . furnish evidence against them." Id.
14 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2295. 15 Id. The Code of Federal Regulations provides the following description of administrative detention: "Administrative detention is the status of confinement of an inmate in a special housing unit in a cell either by himself or with other inmates which serves to remove the inmate from the general population." 28 C.F.R. § 541.22 (1982) . A prison warden may "place an inmate in administrative detention when the inmate's continued presence in the general population poses a serious threat to. . . other inmates or to the security or orderly running of the institution," when the inmate is awaiting a hearing for or investigation of a violation of prison regulations, and when the inmate is awaiting "investigation or trial for a criminal act." Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2295.
Inmates confined to administrative segregation face more restrictions on their daily activities than inmates in the general prison population. In Gouveia, for example, Respondents could not interact with inmates in the general prison population while they were detained in the ADU. 704 F.2d at 1118. In addition, Respondents lost the opportunity to participate in many prison programs. Id. Respondents, however, did retain access to legal materials, regular visitation rights, daily exercise periods, unmonitored phone calls, and the right to hire private counsel. Id. 16 Brief for United States, supra note 8. Although "inmates held in administrative detention are not denied access to counsel," Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1119, each respondent in this case lacked the financial resources to hire an attorney. 21 Id. In support of their motion to dismiss the indictments against them, Respondents posited three arguments: (1) the 19-month delay between the stabbing incident and the grand jury indictment violated their fifth amendment right to due process; or alternatively, (2) that their 20-month isolation in the ADU without appointed counsel infringed on their sixth amendment right to counsel; and (3) that the lengthy delay before indictment violated their right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the sixth amendment. Id. In early September, the Unit Disciplinary Committee, comprised of the inmates' counselor and case managers, conducted a disciplinary hearing concerning Mills and Pierce. Id. At that hearing, the Committee informed Mills and Pierce that "based on confidential sources, the government had concluded that they were responsible for the murder of Thomas Hall." Id. During the hearing, the Committee denied respondents' repeated request for appointed counsel. Id. About September 13, 1979, prison authorities summoned the inmates to a hearing in front of the Institutional Disciplinary Committee conducted by senior prison administrators. Id. Again, prison officials told Mills and Pierce that "they were guilty of the Hall murder." Id. They ordered that Mills and Pierce continue to be detained in administrative segregation. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2295. Prison authorities again denied Respondents' request for appointed counsel. Mills, No. 80-278.
On March 27, 1980, after seven months in the ADU, a federal grand jury indicted Respondents on charges of first degree murder and conveyance of a weapon in prison. Id. Inmate Pierce also was charged With assault. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2296. Respondents were not appointed counsel until their arraignment on April 21, 1980. Id. At that time, they were released from the ADU. Id. Thus, Mills and Pierce were isolated in administrative detention for eight months without access to appointed counsel. Id.
Before their trial began, Respondents filed a motion seeking the dismissal of their indictments. Id. at 2296. Respondents argued that their eight-month detention in the ADU without the appointment of counsel violated their sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. In addition, Respondents claimed that the lengthy delay before their indictment violated their fifth amendment right to due process and their sixth amendment right to a speedy trial. Id. The district court dismissed the indictment. Id. The court of appeals, however, reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for trial. Id. At trial, Respondents were convicted on all counts. Id. Respondents appealed their convictions. Id. 25 Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1116. The court of appeals decided to reverse the convictions by a vote of 6-5. 26 Id. 27 Id. at 1119. 28 Id. at 1125. To qualify for appointed counsel under the sixth amendment in cases like this one, the court of appeals stated that the inmate must:
(1) be held in isolation for more than 90 days, dents' sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated 29 by their twenty-month isolation in administrative detention. 3 0 Thus, the court reversed Respondents' convictions and dismissed their indictments .31 In reaching its decision, the majority of the court of appeals distinguished Gouveia from other right to counsel cases because Gouveia involved prisoners. 3 2 The majority stated that although a suspect must be accused to be guaranteed the right to counsel, suspects already incarcerated and subjected to prison authority may be accused for purposes of the sixth amendment when suspects outside of prison are not. 33 To determine what constitutes an accusation for purposes of the sixth amendment, the majority established a test de-(2) request the assistance of counsel, (3) establish indigency, and (4) show that one of the reasons he is confined to the ADU is because he is being investigated for a criminal act or awaiting trial. Id. at 1124. Once the inmate has established these elements, prison officials have three options. They may (1) show that the inmate is not being detained because an investigation is underway or a trial for a criminal act is pending, (2) appoint counsel, or (3) release the inmate from the ADU into the general prison population. Id.
The court of appeals, relying on current federal prison regulations, see 28 C.F.R. § 541.11 (1982) , decided that an indigent inmate confined to the ADU because of a pending criminal investigation is entitled to appointed counsel after 90 days in isolation. Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1124. Prison regulations specify that one may be confined in the ADU for disciplinary reasons for a maximum of 90 days. Id. The 90-day limit consists of a maximum 30 days in isolation while awaiting a disciplinary hearing and 60 days in disciplinary segregation. Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that "[ilsolation for more than ninety days . . . is necessarily for some purpose other than discipline." Id. (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)). When a suspect is already in prison, however, "[flormal charges need not be brought until the government is ready for trial because the suspect can be isolated without being arrested." Id. at 1122. Thus, the standard used to trigger the right to counsel for suspects outside a prison may be ineffective in a prison setting. For example, if an arrest is required to trigger the right to counsel, an inmate may be effectively accused of a criminal act in prison but nevertheless be denied the assistance ,of appointed counsel because the inmate was not "arrested" in connection with the alleged offense. See id. The court of appeals concluded that " [t] o insist that an inmate is not 'accused' until formal charges are initiated is to ignore reality." Id. But see infra note 44 and accompanying text. After applying this test to the facts of Gouveia, the majority of the court of appeals concluded that, in Gouveia, administrative detention served an accusatory purpose. 3 7 The majority classified Respondents' confinement in the ADU as accusatory because Respondents were being investigated for criminal activities while isolated in administrative segregation. 3 8 Furthermore, the majority found that Respondents had confronted government prosecutorial forces prior to indictment. 3 9 In addition, the majority explained that confining Respondents to the ADU for more than ninety days impeded their ability to prepare an adequate defense because they were unable to investigate the criminal charges against them. 40 Accordingly, the majority held that Respondents were denied their sixth amendment right to counsel during their extended isolation in administrative detention. The dissent in the court of appeals opinion, however, concluded that none of Respondents' constitutional rights had been violated. 4 2 The dissent found that the right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment is triggered only by the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings, 43 682 (1972) , for the proposition that the right to counsel attaches only at or after the initiation of formal adversary proceedings. According to Kirby, adversary judicial proceedings include the "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment." 406 U.S. at 688-89; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
By contrast, the dissent noted that the sixth amendment right to speedy trial may 1984] SUPREME COURT REVIEW not. 44 The dissent also noted that even without relying on the sixth amendment right to counsel to ensure a fair trial, Respondents had adequate protection against government interference with the preparation of their case. 4 5 Both the "ethical responsibility" required of the government prosecutor and the due process standards in the Constitution guarantee fairness in the adversary criminal process.
6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 4 7 limited to the issue of whether the sixth amendment entitles an indigent inmate the assistance of appointed counsel prior to the formal indictment proceeding if prison authorities confine the inmate to administrative detention while the inmate's involvement in a criminal act is being investigated. holding that Respondents were not entitled to the assistance of counsel during their preindictment segregation in the ADU. 50 More specifically, the majority found that "the right to counsel attaches only at or after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings against the defendant." 5 ' The majority based its opinion on prior court decisions that considered the sixth amendment right to counsel outside a prison setting.
52
The majority found that both the language and the purpose of the sixth amendment support the conclusion that the right to counsel attaches only at or after the start of adversary judicial proceedattach at points other than the formal initiation of adversary criminal proceedings. Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1127 (Wright, J., dissenting). The dissent contended, however, that the majority confused the sixth amendment right to counsel with the sixth amendment guarantee of speedy trial when it ruled that an inmate confined to the ADU for more than 90 days while being investigated for a criminal act stands accused for purposes of the sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. (Wright, J., dissenting). The right to counsel extends only to trial-like confrontations between the suspect and federal authorities. Id. (Wright, J., dissenting). Thus, the dissent concluded that, until indicted, Respondents "faced no confrontation for which the right to counsel was designed." Id. (Wright, J., dissenting); see supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. 
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RIGHT TO COUNSEL ings. 5 3 First, the Court found that the sixth amendment specifies the presence of both a "criminal prosecution" and an "accused" in connection with the right to counsel. 54 The majority held that an inmate is not accused until the initiation of formal adversary proceedings because it is not until that point that the government actually has committed itself to prosecute the inmate. 55 Second, the Court held that the purpose underlying the right to counsel is to guarantee to the accused the assistance of counsel "at critical confrontations with his adversary." ' 5 6 Thus, the majority found that inmates confined in administrative detention have no right to appointed counsel prior to the initiation of adversary proceedings because, before that time, inmates are not confronted by experienced public prosecutors and the intricacies of criminal law. 5 7 The Court also rejected the analogy, relied on by the court of appeals, that because the sixth amendment right to speedy trial can attach before the initiation of formal adversary proceedings, 5 the right to counsel also attaches prior to the commencement of formal proceedings in some situations. 5 9 The Court held that the right to counsel and the right to speedy trial are distinct rights designed to protect different interests. 6 0 The right to counsel protects individuals during trial-like confrontations with prosecutors. 6 1 The right to speedy trial, however, protects individuals against undue impair-53 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2298. 54 Id.; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text. 55 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2298 (citing Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689). Although the majority did not address specifically what constitutes a "criminal prosecution," the majority implied that proceedings including a "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment" would satisfy the criminal prosecution requirement. Id. at 2298.
56 Id. Critical confrontations between the accused and their adversary traditionally occur at trial. In cases where an individual is confronted with an expert adversary and intricate legal issues before trial, however, the Court has extended the right to counsel to pretrial proceedings. Id.; see also Wade, 388 U.S. at 224. Pretrial proceedings are classified as critical confrontations when the results of the proceeding might settle the accused's fate and render the trial meaningless. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2298. 57 The majority reasoned that "the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself" when confronted with the complexities of criminal law and the experience of a government prosecutor. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2298 (quotingjohnson, 304 U.S. at 462-63).
58 Id. at 2299; see also supra note 44. The Court's sixth amendment speedy trial cases have held that the right to speedy trial may attach as early as "arrest and holding [the suspect] to answer a criminal charge." Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2299 (quoting United States v. McDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1982) Although the Court recognized that the sixth amendment guarantee of representation by counsel enhances the fairness of an accused's trial, 63 the Court held that appointing indigent inmates counsel prior to their indictment is not necessary to ensure this right. 64 The majority found that the fifth amendment guarantee of due process 65 and the statute of limitations associated with each offense 66 adequately protect inmates' rights to a fair trial prior to the initiation of formal proceedings. 6 7 The Court held that the due process protection, and implicitly statutes of limitation, require the dismissal of a case against an accused should delay in the initiation of formal proceedings prejudice an accused's defense. 68 Thus, ordering the appointment of counsel prior to the initiation of formal adversary proceedings was unnecessary. 63 See supra note 36. 64 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2299. 65 The majority explained the function of the fifth amendment due process clause as follows:
The Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the government's delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice in presenting his defense. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2300 (citing United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1977) ; Marion, 404 U.S. at 324).
66 The statute of limitations applicable to each offense protects an inmate against the potential prejudice of extended preindictment delays by prohibiting the prosecution from bringing stale charges against him. Id. (citing Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 788-89; Marion, 404 U.S. at 322).
67 Id. at 2299; see also supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. The majority in the court of appeals decision raised the possibility that prejudice to an inmate's rights could arise from preindictment delays. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. The court of appeals held that a delay in the initiation of formal adversary proceedings would prejudice the inmates' rights if the government used the delay to prepare a case against the inmates while they were isolated in the ADU without the assistance of appointed counsel. Gouveia, 704 F.2d at 1122. Justice Stevens contended that these cases established a test to provide an accused with counsel if the accused needed the assistance of counsel at a particular pretrial confrontation to preserve a fair trial. 72 Second, Justice Stevens asserted that suspects can be "sufficiently 'accused'" prior to the commencement of formal charges against them to trigger the sixth amendment right to counsel. 73 Justice Stevens reasoned that if authorities confront suspects to facilitate the development of cases against them, then these suspects have become accused and have a right to counsel even though no formal charges have been filed against them.
74
Justice Stevens found no evidence, however, that Respondents' confinement in the ADU served an accusatorial function. 7 5 Because Respondents were not accused, Justice Stevens found no reason to determine whether the failure to appoint counsel prior to the initiation of formal proceedings jeopardized Respondents' rights to a fair trial. 7 6 Thus, the concurrence concluded that failing to provide Respondents with appointed counsel while they were isolated in the ADU did not violate the sixth amendment. 71 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) . See also supra note 3 and accompanying text. 72 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2302 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Wade, 388 U.S. at 227). The concurringJustices recognized that the right to counsel under the sixth amendment was contingent upon the nature of the confrontation between the accused and the State as opposed to the formal initiation of adversary proceedings. The concurrence asserted that "in addition to counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 226).
73 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). 74 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). 75 Id. at 2303 (Stevens, J., concurring). The concurring Justices assumed Respondents were confined to the ADU for security reasons. Id. (Stevens,J., concurring). They found no evidence that Respondents were isolated in administrative detention to aid prosecutorial efforts or to facilitate an investigation of the inmates' murders. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). But see supra notes 9, 24 and accompanying text; infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
76 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2303 (Stevens, J., concurring). 77 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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D. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Marshall dissented from the Court's holding. 78 He contended that the scope of the sixth amendment right to counsel is not restricted to confrontations that occur at or after the commencement of the formal adversary process. 79 The dissent claimed that the Constitution guarantees an individual who is effectively "accused" 80 the assistance of appointed counsel before the initiation of formal judicial proceedings. 8 '
In this case, Justice Marshall found that respondents' preindictment segregation in the ADU did serve an accusatorial function. 80 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. Justice Marshall agreed with the concurring Justices that individuals effectively are accused when they are deprived of their liberty or subjected to investigations that will further the prosecution's efforts to convict them. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2304 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2303-04 (Marshall,J., dissenting). 82 Id. at 2304 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see supra note 75 and accompanying text. 83 The government's admission about pending criminal investigations pertained to all six respondents. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2304 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The dissent further supported its conclusion with respect to Mills and Pierce with the factual findings of the district court. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The district court had found the following:
By the evening of August 22, 1979, when the defendants were placed in segregation, the finger of suspicion had already been pointed toward them. As government counsel conceded during argument, had the defendants been at large on the evening of the murder, under the circumstances of this case they would have been promptly arrested, taken before a magistrate and provided with counsel. Mills, No. 80-278; see also supra note 24.
84 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2305 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Because the majority disposed of the sixth amendment issue by finding that no constitutional rights had been abridged, see supra note 50 and accompanying text, it did not have to address the issue of what remedy would have been appropriate. Id. at 2304 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Because Justice Marshall found that the court of appeals correctly held that Respondents' sixth amendment rights had been violated, he had to determine an appropriate remedy.
Id. at 2304-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. Justice Marshall concluded that the court of appeals' decision to dismiss the indictments against Respondents was correct. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2305 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Although the Court found that limiting the right to counsel only to periods at or after the initiation of formal adversary proceedings is consistent with its prior decisions, a close reading of the Court's prior decisions does not support this conclusion. Indeed, the decision in Gouveia departs from the Court's prior emphasis on guaranteeing the representation of counsel necessary to ensure individuals assistance when they are confronted with the adversarial forces of the State and to facilitate a fair trial. These important policy considerations suggest that an individual may be entitled to the assistance of counsel before formal judicial proceedings commence.
A. APPLICATION OF PRIOR DECISIONS TO GOUVEIA
The Gouveia majority relied on its decisions in Brewer v. Williams, 8 5 Coleman v. Alabama, 8 6 and United States v. Wade 8 7 to reach its conclusion that the right to counsel attaches only at or after the formal initiation of adversary proceedings. 8 8 Although the fact patterns in each of these cases involved confrontations after the initiation of adversary proceedings, 9 the language in these decisions definitely extended the right to counsel to situations occurring prior to the commencement of formal adversary proceedings. In addition, the Court's holdings in United States v. Ash, 90 , formal adversary proceedings clearly had commenced prior to the incidents that triggered the right to counsel inquiry. For example, in Williams, the Court addressed the respondent's right to counsel during a postarraignment interrogation. 430 U.S. at 390-93. In Coleman, the Court considered whether the petitioners were entitled to appointed counsel during a preliminary hearing. 399 U.S. at 8-10. In Wade, the Court deliberated whether subjecting the respondent to a postindictment lineup in the absence of his attorney violated his sixth amendment right to counsel. 388 U.S. at 227-28.
See also Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (an individual indicted for murder who was subjected to a psychiatric examination while held in prison was entitled to the assistance of counsel during the examination); Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964) (incriminating statements deliberately elicited by federal agents from an individual free on bail after indictment for narcotics activities in the absence of his attorney deprived the individual of the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment).
Accordingly, the Court has had few, if any, opportunities to evaluate whether an individual should be afforded the assistance of counsel before the initiation of formal judicial proceedings. Thus, the majority's narrow interpretation of the right to counsel in Gouveia may be explained by the Court's effort to act consistently with its prior decisions instead of focusing on the language and spirit of the sixth amendment.
90 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
sentation by counsel prior to the commencement of the formal criminal process.
In United States v. Ash, the Court developed a test to determine when an individual is entitled to the assistance of counsel. 0 9 The test called for "an examination of the event in order to determine whether the accused required aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting his adversary." 1 0 Although originally the right to counsel guarantee was designed to insure an accused the assistance of counsel at trial,"' later the right to counsel was extended to critical pretrial events where the accused needed assistance. 1 2 The Court in Ash held that a pretrial lineup may trigger the sixth amendment right to counsel 1 3 because an accused's fate may be decided by the "trial" that occurs at the pretrial confrontation as opposed to in the courtroom.' "4 Thus, the right to counsel guarantee was not restricted to events following the formal initiation of judicial proceedings.
In Escobedo v. Illinois, police held the petitioner in custody and interrogated him about a fatal shooting before indictment. 115 The Court held that in this context, petitioner had a right to counsel even though formal adversary proceedings had not been initiated at the time of interrogation. 1 6 The Court noted that when the petitioner's request to consult with his attorney was denied, the investi-109 The Court considered whether an accused has the right to counsel at a postindictment photo display conducted by the government to determine whether a potential witness can identify the alleged offender. 413 U.S. at 303. The Court found that the pretrial photo identification was unlikely to prejudice the accused. Id. at 317. The Court held that because the accused was not present during the photo display, he was not confronted with the prosecutorial forces of his adversary. Id. Thus, the sixth amendment does not guarantee the assistance of counsel at the photographic identification session. Id. at 321. , agreed with the Court in Escobedo that the right to counsel guarantee should not be affected by the commencement of formal adversary proceedings. The dissent argued that " 'The initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings' is completely irrelevant to whether counsel is necessary at a pretrial confrontation in order to safeguard the accused's [Vol. 75
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
gation was no longer a general inquiry into "an unsolved crime." '1 17 Under these circumstances, the Court held that "[pletitioner had become accused, and the purpose of the interrogation was to 'get him' to confess his guilt." 1 18 The Court concluded that when the pre-indictment interrogation shifts from investigatory to accusatory and seeks a confession from the suspect, the accused is entitled to the assistance of counsel based on the sixth amendment. 1 1 9
In Miranda v. Arizona, the suspect was held in police custody and interrogated before formal charges had been filed against him.' 20 The Court held that a suspect is guaranteed the assistance of an attorney during custodial interrogation to reduce the possibility of prejudice resulting from abuse of the interrogation process.' 2 '
The decisions of the Court in Ash, Escobedo, and Miranda do not support the position of the majority in Gouveia that the "right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary proceedings have been initiated."' 22 Instead, those cases conclude that the right to counsel may be triggered before adversary proceedings begin. In Ash, the Court recognized that the accused may need the assistance of counsel before formal proceedings begin to effectively deal with complex legal questions and experienced adversaries.12 3 Both Escobedo and Miranda emphasize that an individual is entitled to repreconstitutional rights to confrontation and the effective assistance of counsel at his trial." Id.
117 Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 485 (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 317 (1960) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
118 Id. at 485. The Court found that at the time of the interrogation, "[p]etitioner had, for all practical purposes, already been charged with murder." Id. at 486.
119 Id. at 492. The Court found that the presence of counsel was necessary to advise the petitioner of his rights during interrogation. Id. at 486. Rights not declared during the interrogation process may be lost forever. Id. The Court reiterated the petitioner's need for counsel with its conclusion that "what happened at this interrogation could certainly 'affect the whole trial.'" Id. (citing Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 59 (1961) ).
120 Id. at 477. 121 The Gouveia majority noted that the decision in Miranda was based on the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination as opposed to the sixth amendment right to counsel. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2298 n.5. Accordingly, the majority asserted that Miranda's holding that an individual is entitled to the assistance of counsel prior to the initiation of adversary proceedings under the fifth amendment does not necessarily contradict Gouveia's holding that the right to counsel attaches at or after the commencenment of judicial proceedings under the sixth amendment. Id. Although analytically precise, this technical splitting of fifth and sixth amendment rights ignores the shared goal of both constitutional provisions, ensuring the accused a fair trial. Wade, 388 U.S. at 226. In fact, the Supreme Court has suggested that the reasoning in the right to counsel cases decided under the fifth amendment may be applicable to cases decided under the sixth amendment. Id.
122 Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2297. 123 413 U.S. at 307-11.
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795 SUPREME COURT REVIEW sentation by counsel at any interrogation that becomes accusatory, instead of investigatory, to protect individual's rights from prejudice. 124 In Gouveia, Respondents clearly were accused before the initiation of formal adversary proceedings. 25 In fact, during prison interrogations, authorities told Respondents that they knew Respondents were responsible for the prison murders. 26 Respondents in Gouveia, moreover, were forced to stand alone against experienced adversaries during potentially prejudicial proceedings before the formal criminal prosecution commenced. 127 Thus, according to Ash, Escobedo, and Miranda, Respondents in Gouveia were entitled to the assistance of counsel during their isolation in the ADU.
B. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to departing from the principles established in its prior decisions, the Court's holding in Gouveia that the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the commencement of formal adversary proceedings ignored two important policy considerations. First, the sixth amendment guarantee of counsel was designed to ensure that individuals are not forced to stand alone against the State during the prosecution.' 2 8 Specifically, the Court has recognized that defendants confronted with the substantive and procedural intricacies of the law generally do not have the skills required to effectively defend themselves. 2 9 In addition, laymen lack the expertise needed to respond to the prosecution of professional
